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Preface: The aim of this essay is to present an overview of some of the basic concepts
underlying the mainstream approach to the role of economics in the analysis of the
causes and treatment of environmental degradation. It evaluates the mainstream view
depicted by Helm and Pearce and analyses economic externalities in context,
conventional economic approaches and imperfect information.
INTRODUCTION
This paper concentrates on one approach to the problem of environmental
degradation, an approach which might be termed "the mainstream". There is an
alternative radical approach, the main proponent of which is Richard Douthwaite.
The mainstream view is essentially that, while it is a matter for the physical sciences
to assess the present and forecast the future extent of environmental problems, it is in
the domain of the social sciences, specifically economics, that solutions should be
sought. This is so, mainstream proponents contend, because the underlying cause of
environmental problems is human behaviour. Given that human attitudes towards the
environment are unlikely to change in the short term, if at all, the task of economics is
therefore to internalise the environment within economic calculations. (Helme and
Pearce 1991).

The “Mainstream” view
Economists have progressed since the seventies from a view of environmental issues
as localised examples of externalities, which had no major effect on the reasonably
efficient workings of market economies. The globalisation of these issues together

1

with theoretical work on their pervasiveness in economic life led to consideration of
the possibility of their internalisation. (Helme and Pearce 1991).
Environmental effects are externalities i.e. their costs and benefits are not fully
reflected in market exchanges. They represent incomplete or missing markets.
Because environmental assets are not marketable, quantitative methods must be
devised in order to bring them within the ambit of meaningful policy measures. The
alternative is to leave the existing environmental structure untouched which does not
constitute a policy.
Since the information is incomplete, policy initiatives will of necessity be imperfect.
Nevertheless, a substantial pay-off to early implementation of policy is expected
because of long lags and possible irreversible effects. In short, any coherent action
now is better than awaiting an optimal model before intervening. (Helme and Pearce
1991).

Treatment of Environmental Externalities.
Helm et al classify externalities under their institutional contexts, examine some
policy instruments for internalising them and deal with the problems of information
associated with them.

Institutional Context:
(a) Number of Polluters/Pollutees
There are three cases:
(1)
"One-to-One":
This is a special case, the simplicity of which
commends it to modellers. The culprit and injured party are easily identified
and the damages are amenable to measurement. Solutions may be by way of
taxes/subsidies or through negotiation/bargaining.
Regulation and prosecution by the Control Authorities is also relatively
straightforward.
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(2)
"One-to-Many":
Chemical spillages and oil tanker disasters are
examples. The search for a solution becomes more complex due to the
difficulty of measuring the environmental damage and of organising cooperative measures on the part of the victims who are many. Recourse is
typically had to the political and regulatory process in such cases.
(3)
"Many-to-Many":
Ozone depletion and build-up of greenhouse
gases are examples. These are referred to as global mutual extrenalities. The
complexities increase due to the ubiquity of sources. Problems of exhaustive
identification arise and emissions data is costly to collect. An element of selfregulation may be introduced with inevitable drawbacks. Income effects can
also be encountered due to the inelasticity of demand associated with such
products as energy and transport, which typically are affected by
environmental control costs.
(b)

Jurisdictions:

Where externalities are confined within national borders, existing taxation and
regulatory systems can be adapted to take account of environmental policy.
However when environmental problems transcend borders, national
systems/laws are ineffective and the will to support international law is
suspect. In this instance the benefits to the transgressors outweigh the costs of
flouting international convention.

(c)

Economic Systems:

The emphasis in planned economies is on production rather than consumption.
The consequences of environmental degradation will therefore not be
accorded the same level of priority as in market economies. The use of policy
instruments such as marketable permits and property rights is pre-empted by
the nature of planned economies.
The developing world has particular concerns over environmental quality as it
relies heavily on the direct use of natural resources e.g. wood for fuel, direct
drawing of water. They are also particularly sensitive to natural disasters.
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Differences due to economic systems need to be factored into any modelled
solution of the environmental question.

Economic Policy Instruments
Conventional Economic Approaches:
Two are examined; the Pigouvian (after Pigou, 1920), which is based on
pragmatism and the Coasean (after Coase, 1960), which relies on free market
theory.
(a)

Pigouvian Taxes/Subsidies:

Pigou sought to internalise "economic" welfare, i.e. that part of general
welfare which he considered amenable to cash measurement. He attempted,
by means of taxes and subsidies to correct for social costs, which did not form
part of the normal market. The Pigouvian approach accordingly is to impose a
tax on the polluter and to pay a subsidy to the victim. The disbursement of tax
revenue is considered to be a matter for government.
Strengths of the Pigouvian approach are:
1.
The recognition that environmental damage involves a cost which must
be borne in some form by the generator.
2.
There is a presumption in favour of the principle of "the polluter pays".
There is no question of the victim paying.
3.
A pragmatic approach - each case is taken on its merits.
Weaknesses are:
(i)
It is assumed that there are no other market failures, an unlikely
scenario. Pigouvian theory assumes that there will be no distortion of the
market as all polluters are affected by taxes and that as a consequence, they
will face the true marginal costs of production. This is too simplistic.
(ii)
The approach is informationally very demanding. Perfect information
is assumed, e.g., no strategic manipulation of information, no uncertainty
about environmental impact.
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(b)

Laissez faire.

The Coasean school asserts that since externalities are the results of the
absence of markets and their associated property rights, a market in which all
assets were owned would internalise all externalities. If ownership of the
"commons" of land sea and air could be established, remedies could be found
for environmental degradation through the market or ultimately through the
vindicators of private property, the courts.
Strengths of the Coasean Approach:
(i)
It proposes a value - free approach to pollution. It is immaterial
(economically) whether the polluter (taxes) or the pollutee pays (bribes). This
is empirically valid. One method used to discourage pollution by poor nations
is by bribes in the form of subsidies or technological expertise?
(ii)
It introduces the idea of international co-operation e.g. the idea of
inducements to encourage nations to play the game even when it is perceived
that there is no advantage to be gained by the new player.
Weaknesses:
1.
2.

3.

It envisages well functioning markets and does not address the
complexities introduced by monopolies.
It does not address the complexities introduced by the presence of
multiple parties in the bargaining process. Efficiency is lost due to the
likelihood of free-riders and increased transaction costs.
It is not clear who bargains for future generations.

Both approaches suffer a common drawback. Their underlying assumptions
(that markets function well) are at odds with the intrusion of environmental
problems in real world situations.
Imperfect Information.
The real world is devoid of simple full information models such as the
Pigouvian and the Coasean. Precise information on the nature of externalities
and the costs and benefits associated with possible solutions is lacking.
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Uncertainty is present everywhere when we come to consider environmental
problems.
This imperfect information (uncertainty) raises some questions.
1.

How are individual firms and countries to be inveigled to reveal
information which is private to them?
2.
Given that future research will increase the flow of information, do we
wait for an optimal model/better technology or do we act now? The
question of costs and benefits is germane here. Pragmatism suggests
that any decision should be based on such analysis.
3.
Cost-benefit analysis raises a further question. How do we
scientifically model uncertainty? How do we factor in a subjective expected
utility loss, a risk preference and the marginal costs of pollution control?
(Helm and Pearce 1991).
Since the assumption of such factors is highly questionable in the complex
area of global externalities, parameters within which the problems should be
modelled should be sought by way of best and worst case scenarios.
SUMMARY
Helm and Pearce favour a scientific analytical approach towards externalities. They
examine the assumptions of simple modelled solutions and expand on these by
focussing on the complexities introduced by institutional contexts, jurisdictions,
economic systems and imperfect information. They favour pragmatic attempts at
solutions and are confident that these attempts are the bailiwick of economists. On the
other hand Douthwaite adopts a holistic approach to the same problems.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
This essay has reviewed the work of:

Dieter Helm/David Pearce (1991), "Economic Policy towards the Environment: An
Overview" in Dieter Held (ed.)
"Economic Policy Towards the Environment". Blackwell Publishers, Oxford.

6

